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People should follow the law, which includes the statutes 
themselves and the judicial rulings interpreting those statutes. 
However, if the binding judicial interpretation changes, should a party 
be liable for following an old binding judicial interpretation of a 
federal statute at a time when the interpretation was still in effect? Or, 
should a defense allow the parties to shield themselves from liability 
for relying in good faith on the old binding judicial interpretation? 
The courts in the Seventh Circuit faced such a dilemma in 2014 
after a change in that circuit’s judicial interpretation of the venue 
provision in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).1 The 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; M.S., Accountancy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013; 
B.M., International Accountancy, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, 
2012. 
1 Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 185 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 
1065 (N.D. Ill. 2015) [hereinafter Oliva I], aff’d, 825 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2016) 
[hereinafter Oliva II], and vacated on reh’g en banc, 864 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2017) 
[hereinafter Oliva III]. All of the district court decisions on point other than Oliva I 
1
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FDCPA requires that a debt collector who sues to collect a consumer 
debt must sue in the “judicial district or similar legal entity” where the 
debtor lives or signed the contract in question.2 In 1996, in Newsom v. 
Friedman, the Seventh Circuit interpreted “judicial district” to mean a 
circuit court.3 Thus, for example, when a debt collector file suit in 
Cook County, the “judicial district” is the Circuit Court of Cook 
County and the debt collector can file suit in any of the county’s six 
municipal districts, as long as the debtor resides in Cook County or 
signed the underlying contract there.4 
In 2013, relying on Newsom, a debt collection law firm Blatt, 
Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC (“BHLM”) filed suit against a 
debtor, Ronald Oliva, in the first municipal district of Cook County in 
downtown Chicago.5 Oliva did not reside in that district at the time the 
lawsuit was filed.6 While the lawsuit was pending, the Seventh Circuit 
overruled Newsom and issued a new rule in Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, 
LLC that interpreted the “judicial district or similar legal entity” 
                                                                                                                   
have ruled in favor of retroactive application of Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC. See 
757 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Oberg v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker 
& Moore, LLC, No. 14 C 7369, 2015 WL 9478213, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2015); 
Desfassiaux v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 142 F. Supp. 3d 667, 
674 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (holding in favor of retroactive application of Suesz); Browne v. 
John C. Bonewicz, P.C., No. 14 CV 6312, 2015 WL 6165033, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
20, 2015) (same); Rowan v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, No. 14 CV 
08923, 2015 WL 5920873, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2015) (Chang, J.) (same); Conroy 
v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, No. 14 C 6725, 2015 WL 5821642, 
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2015) (same); Portalatin v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & 
Moore, LLC, 125 F. Supp. 3d 810, 817 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (same); Maldanado v. 
Freedman Anselmo Lindberg, LLC, No. 14 C 6694, 2015 WL 2330213, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. May 14, 2015) (same). It is also interesting that Oliva is one of the twenty-eight 
retroactive Suesz cases that the debtor Oliva’s attorneys filed against BHLM between 
August 2014 and July 2015, and that the debtor Oliva testified, “I would say it only 
matters to me because it matters to my lawyer.” See Oliva I, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1064. 
2 15 U.S.C. § 1692i (2012). 
3 Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1996), overruled by Suesz, 
757 F.3d 636. 
4 Id. at 819-20. 
5 Oliva I, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1064. 
6 Id. 
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language in the FDCPA’s venue provision to mean “the smallest 
geographic area that is relevant for determining venue in the court 
system in which the suit is filed.”7 Such an area can be smaller than a 
county if the court system there uses smaller districts, such as the six 
districts of Circuit Court of Cook County.8 Eight days later, BHLM 
voluntarily dismissed its pending lawsuit against Oliva.9 
About one month later, Oliva sued BHLM under the FDCPA 
alleging that BHLM violated the venue provision in § 1692i when it 
filed a collection suit against him at the Daley Center rather than at a 
Cook County courthouse closest to his residence.10 
The district court ruled in favor of BHLM (Oliva I).11 Oliva 
appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s 
decision (Oliva II).12 Then the Seventh Circuit reheard the case en 
banc (Oliva III), where it refused to apply Suesz only prospectively, 
concluding that the debt collector’s venue choice violated the FDCPA 
and that the bona fide error defense did not apply to BHLM’s 
violation.13 In the petition for the rehearing en banc, Oliva argued, 
among other things, that the panel decision in Oliva II incorrectly 
applied the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, 
Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, which held that the bona fide error 
defense under the FDCPA was not available with respect to a mistake 
of law.14 The panel in Oliva II read Jerman to mean that only a debt 
collector’s own mistaken interpretation of the law would prevent the 
application of the bona fide error defense, and found that BHLM’s 
reliance on Newsom was not a mistake of law on BHLM’s part, but 
                                                 
7 Id. (quoting Suesz, 757 F.3d at 638). 
8 Suesz, 757 F.3d at 648; Oliva I, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1066. 
9 Oliva I, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1064. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 1067. 
12 Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 825 F.3d 788, 793 (7th 
Cir. 2016), on reh’g en banc, 864 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2017). 
13 Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore LLC, 864 F.3d 492, 497–99 
(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
14 Id. at 495; Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 
U.S. 573, 576 (2010). 
3
: The Cost of Obeying the Law?: The Seventh Circuit Rejects the Bon
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017




rather an unintentional bona fide error for which such defense 
remained available.15 In contrast, the en banc court in Oliva III read 
Jerman more broadly, concluding that the bona fide error defense is 
not available with respect to all mistakes of law, including where a 
debt collector relies in good faith on a binding court’s interpretation of 
the law that is later overruled.16 Essentially, the Seventh Circuit 
reasoned that reliance on the court’s precedent is permitted only if 
there can be no doubt whatsoever as to the accuracy of the court’s 
interpretation of the law.17 Consequently, the en banc Seventh Circuit 
held that BHLM was not excused under the safe harbor of the bona 
fide error defense.18 
Part I of this article discusses the FDCPA, its venue provision and 
the bona fide error defense, and the retroactive application of judicial 
decisions. Part II reviews the facts and holdings of the Seventh 
Circuit’s en banc decision in Oliva III, as well as the district court 
decision in Oliva I and the Seventh Circuit panel decision in Oliva II. 
Finally, Part III asserts that the Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision in 
Oliva III was improperly reasoned and decided. 
 
THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 
 
Concerned about debt collectors’ use of abusive, deceptive, and 
unfair debt collection methods, Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 
to establish some nationally-uniform controls on debt collection 
methods.19 Congress noted that abusive debt collection practices 
                                                 
15 Oliva II, 825 F.3d at 792. 
16 Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 498. 
17 Amy Jonker, 7th Cir. Divided Panel Holds Debt Collector Liable under 
FDCPA Despite Changes in Underlying Law at Issue, CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. BLOG 
(Aug. 3, 2017), http://consumerfsblog.com/2017/08/7th-cir-divided-panel-holds-
debt-collector-liable-fdcpa-despite-changes-underlying-law-issue/. 
18 Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 500. 
19 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2012); Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 
227 (3d Cir. 2005); Philip White Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of 
Venue Provision of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692(i), 28 
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 523 (2008).  
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contributed to the number of personal bankruptcies, marital instability, 
the loss of jobs, and to invasions of personal privacy.20 Congress 
stated three purposes of the FDCPA: (1) “to eliminate abusive debt 
collection practices by debt collectors”; (2) “to insure that those debt 
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are 
not competitively disadvantaged”; and (3) “to promote consistent State 
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”21 The 
FDCPA deters abusive debt collection practices,22 and “imposes civil 
liability on ‘debt collector[s]’ for certain prohibited debt collection 
practices.”23 Among other provisions, the FDCPA prohibits debt 
collectors from making false representations as to a debt’s character, 
amount, or legal status; communicating with consumers at unusual and 
inconvenient times or places; or using obscene language, violence, or 
threats.24 
The FDCPA is enforced both through administrative actions and 
private lawsuits.25 The following sections explain relevant FDCPA 
provisions and judicial interpretations. 
                                                 
20 § 1692(a). 
21 § 1692(e). 
22 Shauna Cully Wagner, Annotation, Construction and Application of Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) Bona Fide Error Defense, 15 U.S.C.A. § 
1692k(c), 14 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 207 (2006). 
23 Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 
573 (2010) (alteration in original). 
24 See generally §§ 1692b–1692j; Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292–93 
(1995). 
25 §§ 1692k–1692l. In administrative actions, for example, debt collectors are 
subject to penalties of up to $16,000 per day if they acted with “actual knowledge or 
knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that [their actions 
were] unfair or deceptive and [were] prohibited [by the FDCPA].” § 45(m)(1)(A)–
(C); see also Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 16 C.F.R. § 
1.98(d) (2010) (adjusting the maximum civil penalties to $16,000). In civil cases, in 
addition to actual damages, courts may award statutory damages up to $1,000 in any 
action by an individual, or, in a class action, award up to “the lesser of $500,000 or 1 
[percent] of the net worth of the debt collector.” § 1692k(a); see Vartan S. Madoyan, 
Attorneys Beware: Jerman v. Carlisle Holds You Liable for Technical Legal Errors 
under the FDCPA, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2011). 
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A.  Venue Provision of the FDCPA 
 
 The venue provision of the FDCPA limits the venues in which 
debt collectors can file legal actions to collect consumer debts, 
providing in pertinent part that: 
 
 Any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt 
against any consumer shall— 
 (1) in the case of an action to enforce an interest in 
real property securing the consumer’s obligation, bring 
such action only in a judicial district or similar legal 
entity in which such real property is located; or 
 (2) in the case of an action not described in 
paragraph (1), bring such action only in the judicial 
district or similar legal entity— 
 (A) in which such consumer signed the contract 
sued upon; or 
 (B) in which such consumer resides at the 
commencement of the action.26 
 
When a debt collector files a debt collection suit in the wrong venue, 
the FDCPA permits the consumer to sue the debt collector and recover 
“actual damage[s],” costs, “a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined 
by the court,” and statutory “additional damages.”27 
In accordance with § 1692n, federal courts have ruled in several 
cases that state venue statutes or rules must yield to the venue 
provision of the FDCPA.28 As applied to debt collection actions in 
state courts, “§ 1692i must be understood not as a venue rule but as a 
                                                 
26 § 1692i(a) (emphasis added). 
27 § 1692k. 
28 See e.g., Harrington v. CACV of Colo., LLC, 508 F. Supp. 2d 128, 134 (D. 
Mass. 2007); McKnight v. Benitez, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2001). 
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penalty on debt collectors who use state venue rules in a way that 
Congress considers unfair or abusive.”29 
The following sections detail the Seventh Circuit precedent on the 
venue issue under the FDCPA, Newsom and Suesz.30 The debt 
collector BHLM in Oliva filed the debt collection claim against the 
debtor Oliva when Newson was in effect. While the case was pending, 
the Seventh Circuit issued Suesz, overruling Newsom. 
 
1.  Newsom v. Friedman 
 
In Newsom, the Seventh Circuit, interpreting the venue provision 
of the FDCPA, expressly held that for consumer debt collection suits 
in Cook County, Illinois, the relevant “judicial district” in which the 
debt collector could file the debt collection suit was the entire county 
and not the smaller municipal districts within the county.31 The 
Seventh Circuit explained that the statutory language of the FDCPA 
was not ambiguous in the context of this case,32 and thus an Illinois 
circuit court constituted a “judicial district or similar legal entity” 
where a debtor resides under the plain meaning of the FDCPA.33 The 
court pointed to the procedural rules of the circuit court, which 
provided that any action may be assigned to any circuit court judge in 
Cook County for hearing or trial, regardless of the municipal 
department, division or district in which the case was filed.34 The 
circuit court possessed original jurisdiction, and the division of the 
circuit court into subordinate divisions was for administrative purposes 
only, rather than for jurisdictional purposes.35 This interpretation of the 
                                                 
29 Suesz v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 653 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
30 There is no Supreme Court precedent on this issue. 
31 Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1996), overruled by Suesz, 
757 F.3d 636. 
32 Id. at 816–17. 
33 Id. at 820. 
34 Id. at 818–19; ILL. COOK CTY. CIR. CT. R. Order 1, ¶ 1.3(a). 
35 Newsom, 76 F.3d at 818. 
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venue provision in the FDCPA was controlling law for eighteen 
years—until the Suesz decision. 
 
2.  Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC 
 
In Suesz, some eighteen years later, the Seventh Circuit, in a 
divided en banc opinion, held that the “judicial district or similar legal 
entity” for purposes of § 1692i is the smallest geographic area that is 
relevant for determining venue in the court system in which the suit is 
filed.36 The geographic area can be smaller than a county where the 
court system uses smaller districts, such as the township small claims 
courts in Marion County, Indiana that were at issue in Suesz.37 
Overruling Newsom, the court in Suesz ruled that the smallest 
geographic area was the township where the debtor lived or where the 
contract giving rise to alleged debt had been signed.38 Therefore, the 
township’s small claims court was the proper venue for purposes of an 
FDCPA claim, even though state trial courts in Indiana were organized 
by county for both court administration and venue purposes; and the 
Indiana statute and court rule regarding venue in effect at the time 
permitted debt collectors to bring an action in any one of the nine 
small claims courts located in the county where the debtor resided or 
the contract was signed.39 
Judge Hamilton and Judge Posner, in their joint opinion for the 
majority, explained that although the FDCPA does not define “judicial 
district,” the statute’s inclusion of the phrase “or similar legal entity” 
indicated that it was drafted broadly—presumably so the venue 
provision could be applied flexibly to all court systems around the 
country, which vary in structure and nomenclature.40 The court thus 
                                                 
36 Suesz, 757 F.3d at 648. 
37 Id. (concluding that if a debt collector chooses to file suit in a township small 
claims court, venue is determined at the township level, whereas if the debt collector 
chooses to file suit in a circuit or superior court, the debt collector could file it in a 
courthouse in the center of the county). 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 648–49. 
40 Id. at 639. 
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overruled Newsom, explaining that Newsom had adopted a test based 
on the details of court administration rather than on the applicable 
venue rules.41 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Suesz;42 therefore, the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision is still the controlling law in this circuit. 
 
B.  Bona Fide Error Defense 
 
Notwithstanding the civil liability provisions under the FDCPA, 
the FDCPA permits a debt collector to avoid liability for violating the 
FDCPA provisions if the debt collector “shows by a preponderance of 
evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a 
bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures 
reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”43 Under certain 
circumstances, this defense provides a safe harbor for debt collectors 
who improperly file a claim in the wrong venue.44 
However, in Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich 
LPA, the Supreme Court held that the bona fide error defense to civil 
liability under the FDCPA does not apply to a mistake of law—that is, 
a violation of the FDCPA resulting from a debt collector’s incorrect 
interpretation of the FDCPA’s legal requirements.45 
In the Jerman case, the respondents, a law firm and one of its 
attorneys (“Carlisle”), had filed a lawsuit in Ohio state court on behalf 
of a mortgage company to foreclose on property owned by the 
petitioner Karen L. Jerman, a debtor.46 The complaint included a 
“notice” that the mortgage debt would be assumed valid unless the 
                                                 
41 Id. at 638. 
42 Med-1 Sols., LLC v. Suesz, 135 S. Ct. 756 (2014) (mem.). 
43 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2012). 
44 See id.; see also Nichols v. Byrd, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1108 (D. Nev. 
2006). 
45 Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 
604–05 (2010).  
46 Id. at 578. 
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debtor disputed it in writing.47 Jerman’s lawyer sent a letter disputing 
the debt, and when the mortgage company acknowledged that the debt 
had in fact been paid, Carlisle withdrew the suit.48 
Jerman then brought a putative class action against Carlisle, 
asserting that they violated § 1692g of the FDCPA by erroneously 
representing that a debt will be assumed valid absent a written 
dispute.49 Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector, within five days 
of an “initial communication” about the collection of a debt, to send 
the consumer a written notice containing, among other things, “a 
statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of 
the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the 
debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector.”50 
The district court heard the case and granted summary judgment 
to the defendants, concluding that the notice violated § 1692g by 
requiring Jerman to dispute the debt in writing.51 However, because 
the violation was not intentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and 
occurred despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to 
avoid any such error, the defendants were shielded from liability by 
the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense.52 
Jerman appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decision and held that 
the defense in § 1692k(c) is not limited to clerical or factual errors, but 
extends to mistakes of law.53 Factual errors, for instance, include a 
debt collector sending a debtor a collection letter without knowing that 
the debtor has filed for bankruptcy, regardless of the various 
procedures the debt collector maintained to identify bankruptcy and to 
                                                 
47 Id. at 579. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2012).  
51 Jerman, 559 U.S. at 579. At that time, no Sixth Circuit precedential opinion 
had addressed the issue, so defendants relied on another circuit court’s decision. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 580. 
10
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ensure compliance of the FDCPA.54 Clerical errors, for instance, 
include a debt collector mailing a second collection letter shortly after 
receiving consumer’s cease and desist letter—and thus violating the 
FDCPA—notwithstanding the procedures it adapted to avoid any such 
error.55 In contrast, mistakes of law, for instance, include a debt 
collector mistakenly interpreting a provision of the FDCPA.56 
 Jerman petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court, which 
reversed the Sixth Circuit’s decision.57 The Court first examined the 
case using the elements of § 1692k(c).58 The Court then stated that a 
violation resulting from a debt collector’s misinterpretation of the 
legal requirements of the FDCPA under § 1692k(c) cannot be 
unintentional59: it is a “common maxim, familiar to all minds, that 
ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or 
criminally.”60 The Court noted that the administrative-penalty 
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which are expressly 
incorporated into the FDCPA, apply only when a debt collector acts 
with “actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of 
objective circumstances” that its action was “prohibited by [the 
FDCPA].”61 Given the absence of similar language in § 1692k(c), the 
Court reasoned it was fair to infer that Congress chose to permit 
injured consumers to recover damages for “intentional” conduct, 
including violations resulting from a mistaken interpretation of the 
FDCPA, while reserving the more onerous administrative penalties for 
debt collectors whose intentional actions reflected “knowledge fairly 
                                                 
54 Novak v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., 235 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 
2016). 
55 Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1034 (6th Cir. 1992). 
56 Jerman, 559 U.S. at 578. 
57 Id. at 605.  
58 Id. at 576–77.  
59 Id. at 581. 
60 Id. (quoting Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833)). 
61 Id. at 583–84 (alteration in original); 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), (C) (2012). 
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implied on the basis of objective circumstances” that the conduct was 
prohibited.62 
 Second, the Court stated that § 1692k(c)’s requirement that debt 
collectors maintain “procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such 
error” is “more naturally read to apply to processes that have 
mechanical or other such ‘regular orderly’ steps to avoid mistakes.”63 
Even though the majority conceded that some attorney debt collectors 
may maintain procedures to avoid legal errors, nevertheless, it stated 
that “legal reasoning is not a mechanical or strictly linear process.”64 
Therefore, the Court concluded that “the broad statutory requirement 
of procedures reasonably designed to avoid ‘any’ bona fide error 
indicates that the relevant procedures are ones that help to avoid errors 
like clerical or factual mistakes.”65 
Moreover, the Court found additional support for this reading in 
the statute’s context and history.66 The Court noted that Congress had 
essentially copied the relevant sections of the bona fide error defense 
from the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) into the FDCPA.67 In the nine 
years between the TILA’s enactment and the FDCPA’s passage, the 
three federal courts of appeals to consider the question had interpreted 
the TILA’s bona fide error defense as referring to clerical errors; none 
                                                 
62 Jerman, 559 U.S. at 584; see also id. (comparing 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2012), 
which allows courts to reduce liquidated damages relying on the Portal–to–Portal 
Act of 1947 if an employer demonstrates that “the act or omission giving rise to such 
action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act 
or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938”); id. 
(comparing 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(5)(A) (2012), a provision of Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act authorizing court to reduce or remit the total award of damages where 
“the violator was not aware and had no reason to believe that its acts constituted a 
violation”). 
63 Id. at 587 (emphasis added). The Court gave two examples: “the kind of 
internal controls a debt collector might adopt to ensure its employees do not 
communicate with consumers at the wrong time of day, § 1692c(a)(1), or make false 




67 Id. at 590. 
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had interpreted the defense to extend to mistaken legal 
interpretations.68 Thus, the Court inferred that Congress agreed with 
those interpretations when it enacted the FDCPA.69 Additionally, the 
Court reasoned that Congress’ amendment to the defense in the TILA, 
but not in the FDCPA, to exclude errors of legal judgment, was not 
evidence of Congress’s intent to give the defense in the FDCPA a more 
expansive scope for several reasons.70 First, the amendment did not 
obviously change the scope of the TILA’s bona fide error defense in a 
way material to the Court’s analysis, given the consistent 
interpretations of three courts of appeals holding that the TILA defense 
does not extend to mistakes of law.71 Next, it was also unclear to the 
Court why Congress would have intended the FDCPA’s defense to be 
broader than the TILA’s.72 Finally, the Court noted that Congress had 
not expressly included mistakes of law in any of the parallel bona fide 
error defenses elsewhere in the U. S. Code.73 
Further, the majority stated that this decision does not place 
“unmanageable burdens on lawyers practicing in the debt collection 
industry,”74 because the FDCPA contains multiple provisions expressly 
protecting against abusive lawsuits and provides courts discretion to 
                                                 
68 Id. at 589 & n.10 (citing Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 757–58 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (bona fide error defense unavailable for reliance on a pamphlet issued by 
the Federal Reserve Board); Haynes v. Hogan Furniture Mart, Inc., 504 F.2d 1161, 
1167 (7th Cir. 1974) (bona fide error defense unavailable for reliance on advice from 
private counsel); Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 861 (9th Cir. 1974) (similar)). 
However, none of them relied on a binding judicial decision. The Court also noted 
that the interpretations by the three Federal Courts of Appeals may not have “settled” 
the meaning of the TILA’s bona fide error defense. Id. at 590. 
69 Id. at 590. 
70 Id. at 591. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 592. 
73 Id. at 593. The Court compared the bona fide error provision in the 
Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4010(c)(2) (2012), which expressly 
excludes “an error of legal judgment with respect to [obligations under that Act],” as 
well as those in the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693m(c), 1693h(c) 
(2012), which are silent as to mistakes of law. Id. 
74 Id. at 604. 
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adjust any additional damages and attorney’s fees.75 Furthermore, 
many state consumer protection and debt collection statutes contain 
bona fide error safe harbors that are either silent as to, or expressly 
exclude, legal errors.76 
 
RETROACTIVITY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
 
Another important consideration in analyzing the Oliva decisions 
is the retroactivity of Suesz in declaring a new interpretation of the 
FDCPA’s venue provision. The following sections analyze Supreme 
Court precedent on when judicial decisions ought to be applied 
retroactively. 
 
A.  Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson 
 
The Supreme Court articulated its modern approach to decisional 
retroactivity in the 1971 Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson test.77 The test 
considers three factors: (1) whether the decision to be applied 
nonretroactively establishes a new legal principle; (2) whether the 
retroactive application of the new rule would further or retard the 
rule’s operation, given its previous history, purpose, and effect; and (3) 
whether the retroactive application would cause inequity to the extent 
of “injustice or hardship.”78 In Chevron Oil, the issue before the Court 
was whether its decision in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co.79—which resulted in the imposition of a one-year statute of 
limitations for personal injury actions—barred Huson’s action, even 
though Rodrigue was decided after Huson’s action was commenced.80 
                                                 
75 Id. at 597–98. 
76 Id. at 601. 
77 404 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1971), disapproved of by Harper v. Va. Dep’t of 
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993); Richard S. Kay, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of 
Judgments in American Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPP.) 37, 45 (2014). 
78 See Chevron Oil Co., 404 U.S. at 106–07 (quoting Cipriano v. City of 
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)). 
79 395 U.S. 352 (1969). 
80 Chevron Oil Co., 404 U.S. at 98–99. 
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The Court held that the Rodrigue holding should not be applied to bar 
Huson’s action retroactively.81 
 
B.  Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation 
 
The Supreme Court reexamined the retroactivity issue in 
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith82 and James B. Beam 
Distilling Co. v. Georgia,83 but left the issue unresolved. The Court 
confronted it again in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, and, 
by a clear majority, held that “this Court’s application of a rule of 
federal law to the parties before the Court requires every court to give 
retroactive effect to that decision.”84 
Note that there are instances of pure prospectivity and selective 
prospectivity: the former indicates that a court refuses to apply the 
decision not only to the parties before the court but also to any case 
where the relevant facts predate the decision, while the latter indicates 
that a court applies the rule to some but not all cases where the 
operative events occurred before the court’s decision, depending on 
the equities.85 
Therefore, the Supreme Court in Harper forbade only “selective 
prospectivity,” where courts consider whether to apply a new rule 
which the Court has already applied to the parties before it.86 It did not 
                                                 
81 Id. at 100. 
82 496 U.S. 167 (1990). 
83 501 U.S. 529 (1991). 
84 Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 90 (1993). 
85 See e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 535–38 (1991). 
86 See Harper, 509 U.S. at 90; see also Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 
U.S. 749, 752 (1995) (noting, but not expressly addressing, that respondent Hyde 
alleged “Harper overruled Chevron Oil insofar as the case (selectively) permitted the 
prospective-only application of a new rule of law”); see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-3, at 226 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that the 
Harper Court simply “did not hold that all decisions of federal law must necessarily 
be applied retroactively” and explaining that the Supreme Court has never expressly 
“renounced the power to make its decisions entirely prospective, so that they do not 
apply even to the parties before it”). 
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overrule Chevron Oil, which was an instance of “pure prospectivity,” 
where the new rule was not applied to the parties before the Court 
retroactively.87 
C.  Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde 
 
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the retroactivity issue 
in Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde.88 The Court in Hyde held that 
litigants cannot prevail by offering no more than their simple reliance 
on the old law as a basis for creating an exception to Harper’s 
retroactivity rule, or arguing that a court’s refusal to apply the new 
federal law to the parties in a prior case was an effort to create a 
“remedy,” rather than being based on “non-retroactivity.”89 However, 
the Court stated that prospective-only effect may be given under 
special circumstances “where [a] new rule, for well-established legal 
reasons, does not determine the outcome of the case.”90 Under such 
special circumstances, a court may find (1) an alternative way of 
curing the constitutional violation; (2) a previously existing, 
independent legal basis (having nothing to do with retroactivity) for 
denying relief;91 (3) as in the law of qualified immunity, a well-
established general legal rule that trumps the new rule of law, which 
general rule reflects both reliance interests and other significant policy 
                                                 
87 See Harper, 509 U.S. at 90; Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 100 
(1971). The Ninth Circuit recently held that, in the absence of explicit overruling, it 
was still bound to apply new rules purely prospectively when the three Chevron Oil 
factors so required. See Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F. 3d 684, 690–95 (9th Cir. 
2011); see also Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium 
Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1062 (1997). However, we need not address the 
“pure prospectivity” issue here because the Seventh Circuit already determined to 
apply the new rule to the parties before the court in Suesz. 
88 514 U.S. 749 (1995). 
89 Id. at 754. 
90 Id. at 758–59. 
91 See e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep’t 
of Bus. Regulation of Fla., 496 U.S. 18, 40–41 (1990) (finding that where the 
violation depends, in critical part, upon differential treatment of two similar classes 
of individuals, then one might cure the problem either by similarly burdening, or by 
similarly unburdening, both groups). 
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justifications;92 or (4) a principle of law93 that limits the principle of 
retroactivity itself.94 Therefore, Hyde allows a court to not apply a new 
rule retroactively even if the court which declared the new rule has 
applied it to the parties before the court. 
Today, when the Court has applied a rule of federal law to the 
parties before the Court, courts consult Harper and Hyde to determine 
whether to give that decision retroactive application.95 In the absence 
of explicit overruling, courts still need to apply new rules purely 
prospectively when the three Chevron Oil factors so require.96 
 
OLIVA V. BLATT, HASENMILLER, LEIBSKER & MOORE LLC 
 
The following sections explain the factual and procedural 
background of the Oliva case, and the district court’s and the Seventh 
Circuit’s decisions. 
 
A.  Factual Background  
 
In 2002, Ronald Oliva, the plaintiff-debtor, opened an HSBC 
MasterCard account in Chicago while a student at DePaul University, 
                                                 
92 See e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that 
government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from 
liability for civil damages to avoid excessive disruption of government insofar as 
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known). 
93 See e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (concluding that a habeas 
corpus petitioner cannot obtain a habeas corpus remedy where doing so would 
require the habeas court to retroactively apply a new rule of criminal law). However, 
“the Teague doctrine embodies certain special concerns–related to collateral review 
of state criminal convictions—that affect which cases are closed, for which 
retroactivity-related purposes, and under what circumstances.” Hyde, 514 U.S. at 
758.  
94 Hyde, 514 U.S. at 759. 
95 See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); Hyde, 514 U.S. 
at 758–59. 
96 See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 100 (1971); Nunez-Reyes v. 
Holder, 646 F. 3d 684, 690–95 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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and continued to use the account during his subsequent employment 
with CDW at its downtown office.97 Oliva lived and worked in 
Chicago almost continuously from 2002 until he moved back home to 
Orland Park, Illinois in August 2013.98 
Oliva ended up falling behind on his credit card payments and 
HBSC charged off his account in 2012.99 At the end of 2012, Oliva’s 
HSBC account had a final balance of $8,205.20.100 Portfolio Recovery 
Associates, LLC (“PRA”) ultimately acquired Oliva’s account.101 
On behalf of PRA, the law firm BHLM filed a collection suit in 
2014 against Oliva in the Circuit Court of Cook County.102 For such 
relatively small claims, the Circuit Court of Cook County divides the 
county into six municipal districts for venue purposes.103 BHLM filed 
the suit against Oliva in the first municipal district at the Richard J. 
Daley Center in downtown Chicago.104 
In deciding where to file suit, BHLM relied on Newsom, which 
held that the Circuit Court of Cook County is a single “judicial 
district” for purposes of the FDCPA’s venue provision, allowing a debt 
collector to file a suit in any of the circuit court’s six districts as long 
as the debtor lived in Cook County or signed the underlying debt 
contract there.105 BHLM’s standard practice after Newsom was to sue 
all Cook County residents in the first municipal district even if the 
debtor, like Oliva, lived in a different municipal district.106 
                                                 
97 Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore LLC, 185 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 
1063 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff’d, 825 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2016), and vacated on reh’g en 
banc, 864 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2017). Oliva graduated from DePaul University in 2005 





102 Id. at 1064. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1063–64. 
105 Id. at 1064; see Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1996), 
overruled by Suesz v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
106 Oliva I, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1064.  
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At the time the collection suit was filed, Oliva lived in Orland 
Park, which falls within the Cook County Circuit’s fifth municipal 
district, not the first municipal district.107 Oliva retained counsel, but 
never challenged venue in the collection suit.108 Indeed, Oliva 
admitted that the first municipal district Daley Center courthouse was 
a more convenient forum for him than the fifth municipal district 
Bridgeview courthouse, the closest Circuit Court of Cook County to 
his residence.109 
On July 2, 2014, while BHLM’s debt collection suit against Oliva 
was still pending, the Seventh Circuit overruled Newsom and held that 
“the correct interpretation of ‘judicial district or similar legal entity’ in 
§ 1692i [the FDCPA’s venue provision] is the smallest geographic area 
that is relevant for determining venue in the court system in which the 
case is filed.”110 Eight days later, BHLM voluntarily dismissed the suit 
against Oliva.111 
 
B.  Procedural Background 
 
Later in 2014, Oliva filed a lawsuit alleging that BHLM had 
violated the FDCPA’s venue provision, § 1692i, by suing him in a 
venue where he did not reside and had not signed the contract in 
suit.112 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.113 The 
district court granted BHLM’s motion and denied Oliva’s motion.114 
 
                                                 
107 Id. at 1063–64. 
108 Id. at 1064. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Suesz, 757 F.3d at 638). 
111 Id. 
112 Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore LLC, 864 F.3d 492, 495 
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C.  The District Court’s Decision 
 
The district court judge, Judge Elaine E. Bucklo, held that BHLM 
had shown that its violation of the venue provision in § 1692i was the 
result of a bona fide error in relying on the circuit precedent of 
Newsom.115 The court differentiated Jerman stating that the debt 
collector in Jerman had relied on a non-controlling case, and therefore, 
the debt collector could not escape liability relying on the bona fide 
error defense because of his own mistaken interpretation of law.116 
However, here BHLM relied on Newsom, the then-controlling ruling 
interpreting the FDCPA’s venue provision, and “did not exercise any 
‘legal judgment’ of its own.”117 Furthermore, the court drew an 
analogy to another defense under the FDCPA for debt collectors who 
rely on an advisory opinion by the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to avoid liability even 
if “such opinion is [later] amended, rescinded, or determined by 
judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.”118 Therefore, 
BHLM’s reliance on Newsom was not a legal error that would 
preclude the bona fide error defense to apply.119 
Moreover, the court rejected Oliva’s argument that Suesz—which 
declared a new interpretation of the FDCPA’s venue provision while 
BHLM’s debt collection case against Oliva was pending—should 
apply.120 The court stated that the debt collector in Suesz attempted to 
extend Newsom’s holding to a different county court system, whereas 
BHLM squarely relied on Newsom’s holding that the Circuit Court of 
Cook County was one judicial district for purposes of the FDCPA 
                                                 
115 Oliva I, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1067. 
116 Id. at 1066. 
117 Id. (quoting Kort v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., 394 F.3d 530, 538 
n.9 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding no mistake of law where debt collector relied on 
implementing agency’s interpretation and did not exercise independent legal 
judgment)). 
118 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e) (2012)). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1066–67. 
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filings.121 Judge Bucklo noted that “[i]f the Seventh Circuit had 
overruled Newsom in a case involving a Cook County collection suit, 
the court may well have applied its ruling only on a prospective 
basis.”122 Judge Bucklo concluded that the retroactivity holding in 
Suesz was limited to the parties in Suesz.123 
Accordingly, the court held BHLM’s violation of the FDCPA’s 
venue provision was result of a bona fide error in relying upon the 
then-binding precedent, thereby precluding liability under FDCPA.124 
 
D.  The Seventh Circuit’s Panel Decision  
 
On Oliva’s appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.125 
                                                 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 1067 (citing Suesz v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 650 (7th Cir. 
2014) (en banc) (permitting prospective overruling where “the law had been so well 
settled before the overruling that it had been unquestionably prudent for the 
community to rely on the previous legal understanding”)). 
123 Id. (citing Suesz, 757 F.3d at 649 (“[A]dopting a new rule while refusing to 
apply it to the parties before us would raise serious constitutional concerns.”)). 
124 Id. at 1065. BHLM had also argued in the alternative that venue in the first 
judicial district was proper on the ground that Oliva had signed the relevant contract 
in that district. Id. Relying on Portfolio Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Feltman, 909 N.E.2d 
876, 881 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009), which held that “each time [a] credit card is used, a 
separate contract is formed between the cardholder and bank,” BHLM argued that 
“Oliva signed separate contracts with HSBC each time he used his MasterCard in the 
City of Chicago while attending DePaul University and working at CDW’s 
downtown office.” Id. (alteration in original). “Oliva counter[ed] that credit card 
agreements are considered oral contracts, which are incapable of being ‘signed’ 
within the meaning of the FDCPA’s venue provision.” Id. (citations omitted). The 
district court did not address that argument. Id. 
125 Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 825 F.3d 788, 793 
(7th Cir. 2016), on reh’g en banc, 864 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2017). The panel included 
Judge Bauer, Flaum, and Manion, and Judge Manion authored the opinion. Id. at 
789. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de 
novo, “construing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party.” Id. at 791; see Hammarquist v. United Cont’l Holdings, 809 
F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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Even though the panel noted in Oliva II that Suesz did not specify 
the scope of its retroactivity, the judges assumed without deciding that 
Suesz’s holding would apply retroactively to BHLM, and held that 
BHLM’s decision to file suit in the first municipal district of the 
Circuit Court of Cook County violated § 1692i as interpreted by 
Suesz.126 The parties did not dispute that BHLM’s violation was 
unintentional or that BHLM maintained procedures reasonably 
adapted to avoid the error that led to the violation.127 Therefore, the 
panel focused only on the issue of whether the violation was the result 
of a bona fide error.128 The court reasoned that “Newsom’s 
unambiguous holding expressly permitted [BHLM] to file suit exactly 
where it did,” and that “Suesz may have created a retroactive cause of 
action for violations that preceded it, but it did not retroactively 
proscribe the application of the bona fide error defense.”129 Therefore, 
the court held that BHLM’s violation of § 1692i as interpreted by 
Suesz was the result of a bona fide error that precluded liability under 
the FDCPA.130 
The panel also found that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jerman 
did not apply to mistakes of law that relied on controlling circuit 
precedent.131 First, the panel stated that Jerman applied only when the 
debt collector’s violation resulted from the debt collector’s mistaken 
interpretation of the law.132 Here, BHLM simply abided by the judicial 
interpretation in Newsom and did not make “an independent (and 
entirely futile) ‘interpretation’” of the FDCPA’s venue provision, 
“which Newsom had already definitely interpreted and handed down 
as the binding law of this Circuit.”133 Newsom, the then-controlling 
                                                 
126 Oliva II, 825 F.3d at 790–91. 
127 Id. at 791. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 791–92. 
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law, expressly permitted BHLM’s conduct.134 Thus, the court 
concluded that if BHLM’s venue choice under Newsom was the result 
of a mistaken interpretation of the FDCPA, it was the result of the 
Seventh Circuit’s mistaken interpretation, not BHLM’s.135 “[BHLM’s] 
failure to foresee the retroactive change of law heralded by Suesz was 
not a mistaken legal interpretation, but an unintentional bona fide error 
that preclude[d] liability under the [FDCPA].”136 
Second, even if BHLM’s violation was the result of its own 
interpretation of the law, BHLM’s interpretation was not mistaken 
when it was made, resulting in Jerman inapplicable.137 It was the 
retroactive change of the law—entirely outside BHLM’s control—that 
caused BHLM’s conduct later to be deemed a violation under Suesz, 
not BHLM’s mistaken interpretation of the FDCPA.138 
The panel then concluded that BHLM had shown by a 
preponderance of evidence that its challenged conduct was the result 
of an unintentional good-faith mistake that it took every reasonable 
precaution to avoid; accordingly, the bona fide error defense 
applied.139 Therefore, the panel affirmed that the district court properly 
granted summary judgment to BHLM.140 
 
E.  The Seventh Circuit’s Rehearing En Banc  
 
Oliva petitioned for rehearing en banc under Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 35, arguing that the panel decision conflicted 
with both the en banc decision in Suesz and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Jerman.141 The Seventh Circuit granted en banc review, 
                                                 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 790. 




141 Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore LLC, 864 F.3d 492, 495 
(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
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and eventually vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded 
for proceedings consistent with its opinion.142 
The en banc court, in an opinion written by Judge Hamilton, first 
examined the venue issue.143 The court emphasized the FDCPA’s 
congressional purpose “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices 
by debt collectors,” which include “abusive forum-shopping by debt 
collectors choosing the venues for lawsuits to collect consumer 
debts.”144 
The court then analyzed the Seventh Circuit precedent 
interpreting the venue provision of the FDCPA, noting that Newsom 
allowed debt collectors in Cook County to choose freely among the six 
different municipal department districts when BHLM initially filed the 
debt collection case, for purposes of the FDCPA.145 Regardless of the 
sharp change in the interpretation, the court acknowledged that the 
reasoning and holding of Suesz, decided while BHLM’s debt 
collection’s case was pending, “clearly extend[ed] to the municipal 
department districts in Cook County, Illinois.”146 
The court went on to discuss the retroactivity issue under Suesz.147 
The en banc decision in Suesz refused to give the decision only 
prospective effect, and applied the new rule to Suesz itself.148 The 
court acknowledged that as a general rule, judicial decisions are given 
retroactive effect, unlike legislation, which ordinarily is not given 
retroactive application.149 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court sometimes 
                                                 
142 Id. at 494. The court elected not to schedule a further oral argument because 
the court noted that the issues were presented sufficiently in the briefs and opinions 
under review. Id.  
143 Id. at 495. 
144 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012) (emphasis added). 
145 Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 496.  
146 Id. Suesz overruled Newsom and held that a “judicial district or similar legal 
entity” under § 1692i is “the smallest geographic area that is relevant for determining 
venue in the court system in which the case is filed.” Id. (quoting Suesz v. Med-1 
Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc)) 
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applied its rulings in civil cases only prospectively “to avoid injustice 
or hardship to civil litigants who have justifiably relied on prior 
law.”150 However, a prospective-only ruling would be “impermissible 
unless the law had been so well settled before the overruling that it had 
been unquestionably prudent for the community to rely on the 
previous legal understanding.”151 The court in Suesz hypothesized that 
if a circuit court of appeals had continued to follow Newsom but the 
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Suesz and reversed, neither 
Newsom nor the panel’s decision in Suesz would have justified the 
Supreme Court giving its decision only prospective effect.152 The 
court also reasoned that none of the Supreme Court’s FDCPA 
decisions against debt collectors have given any sign of applying their 
holdings only prospectively.153  
The court claimed that “[t]he panel opinion in this case declined 
to apply the Suesz holding on retroactivity,” that the panel noted that 
“Suesz ‘did not specify the scope of its retroactivity,’” and that “the 
panel assumed without deciding that the Suesz retroactivity holding 
would apply to [BHLM].”154 The court then went on to consider the 
good-faith mistake issue under § 1692k(c).155 
As noted by the court in Oliva III, the Supreme Court in Jerman 
held that the bona fide error defense in § 1692k(c) does not apply to “a 
violation of the FDCPA resulting from a debt collector’s incorrect 
                                                 
150 Id. (quoting Suesz, 757 F.3d at 649). 
151 Id. (quoting Suesz, 757 F.3d at 650). 
152 Id. 
153 Id.; see Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 
573 (2010). 
154 Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 497 (majority opinion) (quoting Oliva v. Blatt, 
Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 825 F.3d 788, 790–91 (7th Cir. 2016), on 
reh’g en banc, 864 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2017)). However, the panel in Oliva II, joined 
by Judge Kanne, disputed in the dissenting opinion that “[t]he panel explicitly 
assumed that Suesz’s retroactivity did apply in this case—applied it—and then 
concluded that the bona fide error defense excused [BHLM] from liability for its 
retroactive violation.” Id. at 503 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
155 Id. at 498 (majority opinion). 
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interpretation of the requirements of that statute.”156 The en banc court 
in Oliva III disagreed with the panel in Oliva II that read Jerman 
narrowly as applying only to the debtor collector’s own mistaken 
interpretation of law but not to reliance on a precedent that was later 
overruled as mistaken.157 Instead, the court in Oliva III read Jerman as 
to include all mistaken interpretations of the FDCPA, both mistakes 
supported by “controlling” legal authority and those supported by 
“substantial” legal authority.158 The court also pointed out (and agreed 
with) the Jerman decision that, if § 1692k(c) is a broad defense for 
good-faith mistakes of law, it is not necessary to specify another safe 
harbor under § 1692k(e) for the FTC advice.159 Therefore, the court 
concluded that the Jerman opinion rejected the application of § 
1692k(c) to any legal errors concerning the FDCPA.160 In essence, as 
the court in Oliva III stated, the Court in Jerman read the FDCPA as 
putting the risk of legal uncertainty on debt collectors, incentivizing 
them to stay well within legal boundaries.161 
The court also noted that Newsom and the FDCPA permitted, but 
did not require BHLM to sue Oliva in the venue it chose.162 However, 
the court acknowledged that “if any mistaken interpretations of the 
[FDCPA] were made in good faith, it was in cases like this,” because 
the debt collectors relied on circuit precedent in believing they could 
file debt collections suits in any districts within the county.163 
                                                 
156 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Jerman, 559 U.S. at 604–05). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 499 (quoting Jerman, 559 U.S. at 588 (“Debt collectors would rarely 
need to consult the FTC if § 1692k(c) were read to offer immunity for good-faith 
reliance on advice from private counsel.”)); see also id. (citing Jerman, 559 U.S. at 
605–06 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that Justice Breyer “emphasiz[ed] the safe 
harbor for FTC advice as solution for legal uncertainty”)). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. The majority opinion in Oliva III clarified that they did not address the 
situations where the FDCPA required a debt collector to file in such a venue that a 
court later determined was prohibited. Id. at 501 n.5. 
163 Id. at 500. 
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Moreover, the court declared that a judicial decision interpreting a 
statute is not the law, or the controlling law.164 The court stated as 
follows: 
 
With a statute, however, the controlling law is and always has 
been the statute itself, as enacted by both houses of Congress 
and signed by the President. One judge or a panel of judges 
may or may not understand that text correctly, but the statute 
remains the law even if judges err. . . . Defendant was 
mistaken about the meaning of the statute, and so were the 
panels in Newsom and Suesz. The fact that different sets of 
lawyers, including those with judicial commissions, made a 
legal error does not make it less a legal error.165 
  
Nevertheless, the court stated that in determining damage when the 
FDCPA safe harbor is not available, the court “shall consider, among 
other relevant factors . . . the extent to which such noncompliance was 
intentional.”166 
The court concluded the discussion by comparing the debt 
collection cases with certain Fourth Amendment cases.167 The 
Supreme Court recognized a good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule for Fourth Amendment violations when police officers reasonably 
relied on facially valid search warrants in United States v. Leon.168 
Then, in Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court extended the good-
faith exception to searches—that would otherwise be Fourth 
Amendment violations—conducted in objectively reasonable reliance 
                                                 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1) (2012)). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). The exclusionary 
rule under the Fourth Amendment indicates that evidence illegally seized by law 
enforcement officers in violation of a suspect’s right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures cannot be used against the suspect in a criminal prosecution. 
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
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on binding appellate precedent.169 The en banc court in Oliva III 
stated that such extended rule was unusual, and it was based on “the 
exclusionary rule’s ‘high cost to both the truth and the public safety,’ 
and the absence of offsetting benefits resulting from deterring police 
misconduct when the police are complying with circuit precedent.”170 
The court then distinguished the interest in protecting debt collectors’ 
choice of venue from the stakes under the exclusionary rule as “not at 
all comparable,” and concluded there was no need to create a similar 
exception under the FDCPA.171 
 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S EN BANC DECISION DEPARTS FROM 
PRECEDENT AND CONSISTENCY 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision was improper in at least 
three respects, as discussed in the following sections: (1) retroactivity 
of the new interpretation of the venue provision; (2) bona fide defense; 
and (3) policy justification. 
 
A. Retroactivity of the New Interpretation of the Venue Provision  
 
It is undisputed that when the debt collector BHLM initially filed 
the claim against Oliva in the first municipal district of the Cook 
County, the venue choice was permissible under the then-binding 
decision in Newsom, which interpreted the “judicial districts or similar 
legal entity” under § 1692i as the entire county for Cook County, 
Illinois, rather than the internal municipal department districts.172 
While the case was pending, the Seventh Circuit issued its en banc 
decision in Suesz, overruling Newsom, under which BHLM’s venue 
choice would be improper because Oliva resided in Orland Park, the 
fifth municipal district, and BHLM filed the case in the first municipal 
                                                 
169 Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 500 (citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 
(2011)).  
170 Id. (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 232). 
171 Id. 
172 See id. at 496. 
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district, a different “smallest geographic area that is relevant for 
determining venue in the court system in which the case is filed.”173 
Oliva relied on the “new” law under Suesz to sue BHLM, alleging it 
violated the FDCPA by filing the debt collection case in the wrong 
venue.174 
The Seventh Circuit’s conclusions in Oliva III on retroactivity 
depart from precedent and consistency for the following two 
reasons.175 First, Harper arguably applies only to the judicial rulings 
of the Supreme Court interpreting federal law, where the court 
determined that:  
 
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties 
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal 
law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still 
open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of 
whether such events predate or postdate the announcement of 
the rule.176 
 
The court in Oliva III stated several times that if it were the Supreme 
Court reversing the decision, the decision would have a retroactive 
application; however, it overlooked the fact that the implication of a 
Supreme Court decision may differ materially from that of a Seventh 
Circuit decision, which could support the view that Harper applies 
only to Supreme Court interpretations.177 
Second, even if Harper applies to judicial rulings of the circuit 
courts, and not only to Supreme Court decisions, the retroactive 
application of the new rule in Suesz itself did not extend automatically 
                                                 
173 See id.  
174 Id. at 495. 
175 See id. at 497. 
176 See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 86 (1993) (emphasis 
added); see also Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1045 (E.D. 
Wis. 2010) (declining to apply Harper’s retroactivity rule to a Wisconsin Supreme 
Court decision because “the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal 
law is not at issue”). 
177 See Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 497–500. 
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or guarantee retroactivity to other cases.178 Because the court in Suesz 
already declined to give the new rule prospective-only effect, it was a 
matter of selective prospectivity—whether Suesz applied to other cases 
that involved similar conduct or events occurring prior to the date of 
the decision—triggering analysis under Hyde.179 In Hyde, the Supreme 
Court made it clear that reliance alone may be insufficient to justify 
prospective-only application; however, other special circumstances 
may allow the court to depart from the norm of retroactive application 
under such circumstances.180 Had the court in Oliva applied Hyde, it 
likely would have found a “previously existing, independent legal 
basis (having nothing to do with retroactivity) for denying relief”—the 
bona fide error defense.181 Therefore, the court should not have 
applied Suesz retroactively to Oliva because of the special 
circumstance of the bona fide error defense. 
 
B.  Bona Fide Error Defense 
 
Furthermore, even if Suesz created a cause of action for 
retroactive violations of the venue provision in § 1692i, the Seventh 
Circuit in Oliva III erred by rejecting the bona fide error defense in § 
1692k(c).182 The following sections explain the en banc court’s 
misinterpretation of Jerman and Oliva III’s inconsistencies with the 
FDPCA and its legislative intent. 
                                                 
178 See id. at 497; Suesz v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 649 (7th Cir. 
2014) (en banc) (noting that “adopting a new rule while refusing to apply it to the 
parties before [the court] would raise serious constitutional concerns,” but saying 
nothing about applying the rules to other cases). 
179 See Suesz, 757 F.3d at 649–50; Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 
749, 758–59 (1995). 
180 See Harper, 509 U.S. at 97; Hyde, 514 U.S. at 758–59. 
181 See Hyde, 514 U.S. at 759; 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012).  
182 Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 498–500; see also id. at 502 (Manion, J., dissenting) 
(maintaining that, as the original panel in Oliva II, 825 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 
2016), stated, Suesz may have created a cause of action for retroactive violations, but 
it did not “retroactively proscribe the application of the bona fide error defense,” and 
that Suesz said nothing about the bona fide error defense). 
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1.  Misinterpretation of Jerman  
 
The Seventh Circuit erroneously relied on Jerman to reject any 
bona fide error defense resulting from mistakes of law.183 However, 
Jerman materially differed from Oliva, and therefore did not mandate 
the outcome in the latter case.184 
First, the court in Oliva III overlooked the distinction between a 
debt collector’s own independent mistaken interpretation of the federal 
law and a debt collector’s good faith reliance on federal judicial 
interpretation of the federal law, even if that interpretation is later 
overruled.185 The Supreme Court in Jerman held that “[t]he bona fide 
error defense in § 1692k(c) does not apply to a violation resulting from 
a debt collector’s mistaken interpretation of the legal requirements of 
the FDCPA.”186 However, the debt collector in Oliva, BHLM, did not 
independently interpret the FDCPA’s venue provision when it filed the 
suit in the first municipal district within Cook County.187 It was simply 
relying on the then-binding judicial interpretation under the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Newsom.188 
Second, the Seventh Circuit failed to find a clear and “manageable 
way to distinguish between mistakes” supported by “substantial” legal 
authority, as in Jerman, and those supported by “controlling” legal 
authority, as in Oliva.189 Substantial legal authority, as described in 
Jerman and discussed in Oliva III, is non-binding and “at best 
persuasive,” whereas controlling legal authority is binding in a given 
                                                 
183 See id. at 498–500 (majority opinion). 
184 See id. 
185 See id. at 498; Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 
559 U.S. 573, 574–75 (2010); see also Daubert v. NRA Group, LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 
394 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that Jerman concerns with and controls in cases where 
the debt collectors relied on persuasive legal authority regarding legal issues that 
were unsettled by any relevant binding authority). 
186 Jerman, 559 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added). 
187 See Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 494–95. 
188 Id. 
189 See id. at 499. 
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jurisdiction.190 Therefore, it might have been a mistaken interpretation 
of law for the debt collector in Jerman to erroneously rely on another 
circuit court’s decision (substantial legal authority) when that issue 
was unsettled by any relevant binding authority in its own circuit.191 
However, BHLM made no mistake of law at the time of filing,192 
when it correctly relied on the then-binding decision Newsom in this 
circuit—controlling legal authority—where the issue was well settled 
for eighteen years at that time.193 That is a fundamental difference 
from the mistakes supported merely by substantial, non-binding legal 
authority. 
Third, the Seventh Circuit en banc decision concluded that a 
court’s legal error about the meaning of a statute does not make it less 
a legal error because the statute itself is the only controlling law; 
however, that conclusion is self-contradictory.194 On one hand, the 
Seventh Circuit likely mistook the controlling law as law that will 
always control when it reasoned that “[o]ne judge or a panel of judges 
may or may not understand that text correctly, but the statute remains 
the law even if judges err. That is why overrulings of earlier statutory 
decisions, like reversals by the Supreme Court, are retroactive.”195 
However, the judicial interpretations of federal statutes have always 
been treated as controlling law just as the words of the statutes 
themselves.196 The judicial interpretation may evolve over time, as 
                                                 
190 See id. at 505 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
191 See Jerman, 559 U.S. at 597. 
192 Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 502–03 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
193 See id. at 494–95 (majority opinion). 
194 See id. at 500. 
195 Id. 
196 See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964) (“[Section 1983 and other civil rights] 
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so 
far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they 
are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish 
suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and 
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having 
jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to 
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well as the statue itself when Congress makes amendments. Therefore, 
the judicial decision of the Seventh Court in Newsom interpreting the 
FDCPA was the controlling law until Suesz, where the en banc court 
adopted a new interpretation regarding the statute and that 
interpretation became the new controlling law. On the other hand, the 
Seventh Circuit en banc concluded that BHLM violated the FDCPA as 
interpreted by Suesz, assuming implicitly that Suesz controlled.197 But, 
ironically, as the court claimed explicitly in Oliva III, a judicial 
decision is not law, or controlling law.198 Moreover, if as the court 
stated the statute remains the (only) law even after judicial 
interpretation changes, there is no change of law when the Seventh 
Circuit declared a new judicial interpretation of the FDCPA’s venue 
provision, but the provision itself remained the same. Consequently, 
there is no new “law” in Suesz that needs to apply retroactively to 
Oliva. 
Finally, nothing in Jerman indicates that the Court intended to 
prohibit the bona fide error defense from being used with respect to all 
mistakes of law.199 The Court expressly refused to consider whether § 
1692k(c) applies when a violation results from a debt collector’s 
misinterpretation of the legal requirements of state law or federal law 
other than the FDCPA.200 Moreover, the Court was clear in its warning 
that “we need not authoritatively interpret the [FDCPA]’s conduct-
regulating provisions to observe that those provisions should not be 
assumed to compel absurd results when applied to debt collecting 
attorneys.”201 But the Oliva III decision is exactly an absurd result, by 
punishing the debt collector for its venue choice expressly permitted 
                                                                                                                   
and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a 
criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.”). 
197 Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 494. 
198 Id. at 500; see also id. at 509 (Manion, J., dissenting) (“By denying the 
controlling effect of its own legal determinations, the court pulls the rug out from 
under its own feet.”). 
199 See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 
573 (2010). 
200 Id. at 580 n.4. 
201 Id. at 600. 
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under the then-controlling law, Newsom, and by giving superior 
liability protection to factual and clerical errors as compared to good-
faith reliance on controlling judicial decisions. 
 Therefore, Jerman did not bind the court’s decision in Oliva, and 
the Seventh Circuit should have applied the elements under § 1692(c) 
to determine whether BHLM’s venue selection constituted an 
excusable bona fide error.  
 
2. Inconsistency with the FDCPA and Its Legislative Intent 
 
Additionally, excluding all mistakes of law from the bona fide 
error defense under § 1692k(c) runs afoul of the FDCPA’s legislative 
intent and its other provisions. 
Relying on the court’s binding interpretation to choose the venue 
for filing an FDCPA suit is not an abusive debt collection practice of 
the type that the FDCPA aims to eliminate.202 BHLM’s choice of 
venue was permissible under the then-binding law when it filed the 
collection suit against Oliva.203 Also, as Oliva admitted, the venue 
where BHLM initially filed the suit was more convenient for Oliva 
than the closest courthouse, the proper venue under Suesz.204 
Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit noted in Oliva III, “if any mistaken 
interpretations of the [FDCPA] were made in good faith, it was in 
cases like this.”205 Contrary to the FDCPA’s legislative intent to 
regulate debt collection methods, the Seventh Circuit’s en banc 
decision in Oliva III increased the legal uncertainty of debt collection 
methods and discouraged debt collectors from following courts’ 
controlling precedent, enlarging the harmful risks to debtors. 
Further, there is no reason to believe an agency’s advisory opinion 
should be given more authority than a binding circuit court’s opinion. 
                                                 
202 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012). 
203 Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 495 (majority opinion). 
204 Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 185 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 
1064 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff’d, 825 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2016), and vacated on reh’g en 
banc, 864 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2017). 
205 Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 500. 
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The FTC may answer requests for advice when “[t]he matter involves 
a substantial or novel question of fact or law and there is no clear 
[FTC] or court precedent” or “[t]he subject matter of the request and 
consequent publication of [the FTC] advice is of significant public 
interest.”206 Therefore, the FTC advisory opinions are supplementary 
to court precedent, and the FTC will not issue advisory opinions if 
there is clear court precedent, as was the case with the well-settled law 
in Newsom.207 Moreover, if relying on an FTC advisory opinion could 
protect debt collectors from liability even if the opinion later is 
amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be 
invalid for any reason,208 relying on binding judicial interpretation 
should offer, at least, the same degree of protection. Additionally, 
unlike the Court’s concern in Jerman of relying on private counsel’s 
advice, as compared with an FTC advisory opinion, in the case of 
Oliva, relying on a circuit court’s binding interpretation did not “give a 
competitive advantage to debt collectors who press the boundaries of 
lawful conduct.”209 Congress sought to regulate debt collectors’ 
practices by requiring them to comply with the FDCPA’s provisions, 
which is exactly what BHLM did in Oliva.210 
Therefore, the FDPCA and its legislative intent suggest the bona 
fide error defense should have protected a debt collector who relied on 
the binding judicial interpretation in filing suit in what subsequently 





                                                 
206 16 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2016). 
207 See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 
573, 606 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
208 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e) (2012).  
209 See Jerman, 559 U.S. at 602 (majority opinion). 
210 As the majority noted in Oliva III, Newsom permitted, but did not require, 
BHLM to file the suit in the first municipal district. Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 499. But 
that did not affect the analysis here because BHLM’s choice of venue was still in 
compliance with the law.  
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C.  Policy Justification 
 
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision was improper 
when considered from a policy perspective. 
 
1.  Extra Burden on the Courts 
 
The courts adjudicate cases based on the controlling law at that 
time. The en banc decision in Oliva III will result in significant legal 
uncertainty in the FDCPA, because the opinion states that judicial 
interpretations and decisions (including Oliva III) are not controlling 
law.211 Therefore, the courts will have to independently interpret the 
FDCPA every time when they hear cases, increasing the risk of 
inconsistent interpretations of the FDCPA. 
 
2.  Extra Burden on the Public 
 
As the dissent noted, Oliva III violates due process by not giving 
fair notice to debt collectors of the FDCPA’s requirements.212 “A 
fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate 
persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or 
required.”213 Therefore, it is not “unusual” to give exceptions to good-
faith mistakes by relying on the then-binding judicial interpretation of 
federal statute. The court in Oliva III, however, penalized a law-
abiding litigant who followed the then-controlling law, which is a 
direct violation of this due process principle. 
Additionally, the en banc decision in Oliva III diminishes the 
court’s authority and credibility.214 Under this decision, no protection 
is available for good-faith reliance on the court’s controlling 
                                                 
211 See id. at 500. 
212 Id. at 511 (Manion, J., dissenting).  
213 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012). 
214 Oliva III, 864 F.3d at 511 (Manion, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision also 
gravely undermines the rule of law by discouraging debt collectors from following 
this court’s controlling precedent.”). 
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precedent, or even worse, a federal circuit court’s interpretation of 
federal statute such as the FDCPA can no longer be viewed as 
controlling. How can a party know what is legal if it is required to 
follow only the statute, but not the applicable court of appeals cases 
interpreting such statute? Consequently, the public has to understand 
and interpret the law by themselves. But if our judges are unable to 
make the right decision, how can we fairly impose liability on the 
parties without legal training if they interpret wrongly? In the context 
of the FDCPA, debt collectors have to hope that the existing judicial 
interpretations related to their collection and litigation efforts do not 
change before the case concludes or the statute of limitations runs, and 
that the courts adjudicating their cases adopt the same interpretations. 
Or, if debt collectors apply their own interpretation of the statute and 
act differently from an existing judicial interpretation, they have to 
hope that the courts adjudicating their cases do not rely on the existing 
judicial interpretation and interpret the FDCPA provisions in the same 




The Seventh Circuit’s en banc opinion in Oliva III was 
erroneously reasoned in several aspects, and they reached an improper 
decision as a result. The reasoning failed because Suesz should not 
have been applied retroactively to this case, based on the special 
circumstance exception under Hyde. 
Furthermore, Jerman, which held that the bona fide error defense 
does not extend to debt collectors’ mistaken interpretation of law, is 
not instructive in Oliva, and therefore, even if Suesz applied 
retroactively here, the bona fide error defense should have excused 
BHLM’s liability for the violation of the FDCPA. 
Finally, the en banc decision will result in extra burdens on both 
the courts and the public, and diminish the court’s authority and 
credibility. The public has to understand and interpret the law by 
themselves and hope their interpretation will be same as the judicial 
tribunal’s if challenged at the court. 
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Accordingly, when deciding whether a new interpretation of the 
federal statute should have retroactive effect to the parties before a 
particular court, the court should apply the Chevron Oil test. Once it 
decides to apply the new interpretation to the parties before the court, 
the court then should consult the holdings in Harper and Hyde to 
determine its retroactivity to other cases. In addition, the bona fide 
error defense, if applicable, should excuse the liability for violations 
resulted from good faith reliance on a then-controlling judicial 
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